REMX VanEck Rare Earth/Strategic Metals ETF : Bullish and Bearish Analyst Opinions

China's rare earth dominance is a key strength.

Agen mentioned a $12 billion Project Vault investment by Ex-Im Bank and a global ministerial summit to secure critical minerals supply chains through international partnerships. Significant capital inflow and collaborative alliances aim to reduce dependency on single countries, ensuring stable supply for Western economies. Direction LONG because substantial investment and global coordination indicate strong future growth and strategic importance of critical minerals. Supply chain disruptions, mining challenges, or insufficient global coordination could limit effectiveness and growth.

A potential price floor for critical minerals, negotiated by major economic blocs, would create a supportive backdrop for producers' profitability and valuations.

I'm long a lot of critical minerals, REMX... I'm long AIPO, which is the AI infrastructure play. I'm long grid... I'm long pave. The AI revolution requires massive physical infrastructure, from power grids to critical minerals. Investing in the picks and shovels of AI provides a secular growth tailwind regardless of which software companies win. Long infrastructure and critical mineral ETFs to capitalize on the physical buildout of AI. Delays in government infrastructure spending or supply chain bottlenecks could slow down the growth of these sectors.

I've been talking about Ramx since $65. It is now 98. I'm still bullish. I think it's going to 200. As the US aggressively decouples from China and reasserts its own industrial and energy independence, securing domestic and allied supply chains for strategic metals becomes a top priority, driving massive capital into rare earth miners. LONG because rare earth minerals are a critical bottleneck for modern technology and defense, and Western governments will heavily subsidize this sector to break Chinese monopolies. China floods the market with cheap rare earth minerals to bankrupt Western competitors, or new technologies reduce the need for these specific metals.

"Cobalt... indispensable for electric vehicle batteries... DRC produces nearly three quarters of global supply... Cobalt has become not just a commodity, but a strategic asset." The designation of Cobalt as a "strategic asset" for the US and China implies a floor on demand due to national security stockpiling, regardless of consumer EV cycles. Since pure-play Cobalt miners are rare on US exchanges, the Strategic Metals ETF (REMX) is the most direct instrument to capture the basket of miners extracting these specific battery criticals. LONG. Geopolitical competition ("The race for critical minerals") acts as a tailwind for the strategic metals sector. Substitution risk (battery tech moving away from Cobalt to LFP) or ethical supply chain sanctions blocking DRC exports.

A long on Chinese rare earth stocks is indicated for the market open, driven by government policy support for the sector.

A Pentagon initiative to onshore the supply chain for strategic minerals implies future government funding and contracts, acting as a significant catalyst for domestic producers.

Whitney discusses the "Middle Corridor" (Central Asia) and the "Board of Peace," noting these countries have "dense and rich rare earth mineral content." As global trade routes fracture (Russia blocked, Middle East blocked), the US is forced to develop new supply chains for critical minerals outside of China/Russia/Iran spheres. This directs capital flows to rare earth miners and processors in friendly or neutral jurisdictions. LONG. A geopolitical hedge against supply chain weaponization. Long lead times for mining projects to generate revenue.

Warner mentions that European allies are focused on the President's "crazy folly about trying to take over Greenland." While Warner dismisses it as folly, the Administration's active interest in Greenland—a region rich in rare earth elements and strategic minerals—signals a potential policy push to secure these resources. This focus could drive speculative interest in rare earth miners and Arctic resource plays. WATCH for policy announcements regarding Greenland that could catalyze the Critical Minerals sector. The initiative remains purely rhetorical or fails diplomatically, leading to no material changes for the sector.

Go long rare earth elements as supply shortages are intensifying, suggesting the strategic situation is more bullish for prices than previously believed.

A potential US government policy to set reference prices for critical minerals could act as a price floor or support mechanism, benefiting producers of these materials.

Mullin notes that while SCOTUS limited economic emergency powers for tariffs, the President immediately pivoted to "National Security" tariffs (10% on all countries) to protect industries like steel, aluminum, chips, and rare earth minerals. The pivot to "National Security" justifications allows the administration to bypass Congressional gridlock and maintain protectionist barriers. This directly benefits domestic producers of critical materials (Steel/Aluminum) and strategic tech (Chips) by making foreign imports more expensive. Long domestic industrial and material producers protected by the security thesis. Retaliatory tariffs from trading partners hurting US exporters; potential legal challenges to the "National Security" definition.

"China has banned the export of rare earth minerals to several Japanese companies." This is retaliation for the new US/Global tariffs. China dominates rare earth processing. Banning exports to US allies (Japan) creates an immediate supply shock. This forces price appreciation for the commodity and drives capital toward non-Chinese producers (like MP Materials) as strategic assets. Long Rare Earths (REMX / MP). China reverses policy or finds loopholes; rapid development of alternative battery chemistries.

Busch identifies a "resource war specifically with China" regarding rare earth minerals needed for AI and tech. He mentions China controls 70-80% of supply and the US is pushing for domestic sourcing/recycling. As the US decouples from Chinese supply chains (tariffs/sanctions), domestic producers and non-Chinese miners of rare earths become strategic national security assets. Prices for these assets must rise to incentivize production. Long Rare Earth/Strategic Metals. If China floods the market to bankrupt western competitors (a tactic used previously), prices could collapse temporarily.

There is a "confluence of forces" driving demand for critical minerals (power up, AI, re-industrialization). Capital providers are active, and M&A pipelines are full. Despite tariff noise, the structural demand for copper, lithium, and rare earths is agnostic to short-term policy. The "friend-shoring" narrative (US/Canada integration) favors North American miners. LONG Critical Minerals and North American Mining. Global recession crushing commodity demand.

A high-level US official's stated confidence in a near-term rare earths deal suggests a potential de-risking event and positive catalyst for Western-aligned critical mineral producers.

A new Japanese government initiative to fast-track the development of seabed rare earth resources should serve as a positive catalyst for the sector.

Costa explicitly states, "Why are we giving this such emphasis... Rare earth is not rare." He notes there are too many players focusing on a small, niche market. The sector has become a "speculative bubble" driven by narrative rather than economic geology. Most deposits are uneconomic, and the market size doesn't justify the number of companies. Capital will likely be destroyed here compared to base metals. Avoid Rare Earth miners and ETFs. A specific geopolitical ban by China could temporarily spike prices due to panic hoarding.

Steno is "fully out" of Silver but holds Gold (specifically Barrick), Copper miners, and Rare Earth metals. While the metals trade is strong due to geopolitics, Silver has become a speculative mania (illiquid relative to trading volume). Gold and Copper offer the same thematic exposure but with significantly deeper liquidity and lower volatility-adjusted risk. Long the miners and underlying metals as a safer way to play the commodities supercycle. A strengthening US Dollar or a deflationary bust could hurt commodity prices.

"We saw 40,000 new construction jobs... First we'll get the construction jobs and then the factory jobs are going to come... We need to de-risk... What did they do on critical minerals? What did they do on bringing back semiconductor production? What did they do on bringing back steel to the US?" The administration is prioritizing physical industrial build-outs (factories) and supply chain sovereignty. This "Capex Boom" requires heavy machinery (CAT), domestic steel (NUE), and domestic critical mineral processing (REMX). The specific mention of "bringing back semiconductor production" reinforces the bull case for US-domiciled chip manufacturing (SMH). Long the "Industrial Renaissance" basket (Construction, Steel, Semis, Rare Earths). Delays in factory completions or a global recession reducing demand for raw materials.

Raimondo explicitly states, "China is ready, willing and able to weaponize their critical minerals, rare earths and supply chain." If the primary global supplier (China) weaponizes these assets, the US Government will be forced to aggressively subsidize and protect domestic and allied sources to ensure "economic security." This creates a structural tailwind for non-Chinese rare earth miners and processors. LONG domestic/allied critical mineral producers as national security assets. China flooding the market temporarily to crush competitors before restrictions tighten; regulatory hurdles for new US mines.

"Basically your defense is only as secure as your supply chains are... meeting every single week about rare earth metals to make sure they have the supply." Second-Order Thinking: You cannot have a defense boom without a raw materials boom. If every major defense contractor is stockpiling "12 months of supplies" (as noted regarding Rheinmetall), this creates an artificial demand shock for critical minerals and rare earths upstream. LONG. Defense demand acts as a non-cyclical floor for rare earth prices, decoupling them slightly from general industrial demand. China export controls or new mining supply coming online faster than anticipated.

Avi identifies a "geopolitical mega trend" and notes "Uranium... is going to be very critical to powering the next stage of energy production." The convergence of AI (massive energy demand) and Geopolitics (US isolationism/supply chain security) creates a bottleneck for power and critical minerals. Nuclear (Uranium) and domestic sourcing of Rare Earths are the only viable solutions to power data centers independent of foreign reliance. Long Uranium and Rare Earth miners. Regulatory hurdles for new nuclear plants or environmental pushback on mining.

Burgum announces the creation of a "Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve" for 60 elements, funded by private sector capital but backed by government "price floors" to block China from "illegal dumping to kill the price." The primary risk for Western miners has been China crashing spot prices to bankrupt competitors. A US-guaranteed price floor effectively creates a "government put option" on production, de-risking capital expenditure for domestic miners of Rare Earths (MP), Copper (FCX/SCCO), and Lithium. LONG. The removal of downside price risk via government policy is a massive structural catalyst for US/Allied miners. Implementation delays or legislative hurdles in funding the reserve.

The US is entering an era of "Industrial Policy" and "Mercantilism" (e.g., Trump's "Project Vault" for critical minerals). In a multipolar, adversarial world, efficiency (globalization) is replaced by resiliency (stockpiles). Governments must secure physical supplies of uranium, rare earths, and copper, creating a price floor and structural demand. Structurally bullish on commodities essential for national security and energy. Government price controls or windfall taxes on mining companies.

"If the United States is going to be investing billions and billions... in rare earths... I think that that's certainly a place to be." Government fiscal support acts as a guaranteed revenue stream and strategic floor for domestic rare earth producers. As the US decouples supply chains, domestic miners (MP) and the broader sector (REMX) benefit directly from federal capex. LONG. Strategic alignment with US industrial policy creates a multi-year tailwind. Environmental regulation delays or cheaper Chinese dumping of rare earths.

Uranium (URA) is at $53 and Rare Earths (REMX) at $85. These assets plummeted alongside Gold and Silver during the recent crash. This is a "correlation failure." Retail and algos treated these assets as high-beta plays on Gold. When Gold crashed, these were sold indiscriminately. However, their fundamentals (nuclear energy ramp-up) are uncorrelated to Gold's monetary premium. The sell-off is technical, not fundamental. Buy the "unfairly dragged around" assets. The "Mega Trend" (nuclear/critical minerals) timeline exceeds the short-term volatility of the metals crash. Continued broad market "risk-off" flows could suppress all commodities regardless of fundamentals.

Uranium (URA ETF at $53) and Rare Earths (REMX at $85) have sold off aggressively alongside Gold and Silver. This is a correlation dislocation. Retail and algos sold "all metals" blindly. However, Uranium and Rare Earths are driven by a "mega trend" (nuclear energy ramp-up) and are not monetary assets like Gold. The sell-off is a liquidity event, not a fundamental one. Buy the dip. These assets were "unfairly dragged around" and offer a better entry than the crowded precious metals trade. Continued broad market risk-off sentiment could suppress all commodities regardless of fundamentals.

Avi states that unlike Silver, assets like Rare Earths (REMX), Copper, and Uranium have genuine industrial and national security demand. He explicitly mentions the US will likely increase investment in domestic mining in the next 6-12 months. In a "fractured, multipolar world," nations must secure their own supply chains for energy and defense. This creates a structural supply deficit for these specific commodities that does not exist for speculative metals like Silver. LONG. These are "buy the dip" assets because they are supported by a multi-decade secular trend of deglobalization. A global recession could dampen industrial demand for Copper specifically.