Jamieson Greer

"I think what you want to look is what are the feed stocks doing in China. Because some of these hydrocarbons go into the plastics industry, the chemicals industry in China. I think we're more resilient on that front because we have a lot of domestic feedstocks." The Iran conflict is disrupting cheap oil flows to China, which raises the input costs for Chinese chemical and plastics manufacturers. US chemical companies utilize domestic natural gas liquids (NGLs) as feedstocks. Because US domestic energy is abundant and insulated from Middle East shocks, US chemical producers gain a massive margin and pricing advantage over their Chinese competitors. LONG US chemical and plastics manufacturers who benefit from structurally cheaper domestic feedstocks while international competitors face supply shocks. The Iran war ends faster than expected (Greer predicts "weeks"), which would normalize global oil prices and erase the relative feedstock cost advantage for US producers.

"I think what you want to look is what are the feed stocks doing in China. Because some of these hydrocarbons go into the plastics industry, the chemicals industry in China. I think we're more resilient on that front because we have a lot of domestic feedstocks." The Iran conflict is disrupting cheap oil flows to China, which raises the input costs for Chinese chemical and plastics manufacturers. US chemical companies utilize domestic natural gas liquids (NGLs) as feedstocks. Because US domestic energy is abundant and insulated from Middle East shocks, US chemical producers gain a massive margin and pricing advantage over their Chinese competitors. LONG US chemical and plastics manufacturers who benefit from structurally cheaper domestic feedstocks while international competitors face supply shocks. The Iran war ends faster than expected (Greer predicts "weeks"), which would normalize global oil prices and erase the relative feedstock cost advantage for US producers.

Greer explicitly stated that the U.S. wants to sell Boeings to China as part of optimizing bilateral trade. The proposed U.S.-China Board of Trade could formalize mechanisms to increase U.S. exports, including Boeing aircraft, to the Chinese market. This indicates potential growth in Boeing's sales and revenue from China, supporting a LONG view. Trade negotiations may fail, or China could resist purchasing Boeing aircraft due to geopolitical tensions or competing interests.

"I think what you want to look is what are the feed stocks doing in China. Because some of these hydrocarbons go into the plastics industry, the chemicals industry in China. I think we're more resilient on that front because we have a lot of domestic feedstocks." The Iran conflict is disrupting cheap oil flows to China, which raises the input costs for Chinese chemical and plastics manufacturers. US chemical companies utilize domestic natural gas liquids (NGLs) as feedstocks. Because US domestic energy is abundant and insulated from Middle East shocks, US chemical producers gain a massive margin and pricing advantage over their Chinese competitors. LONG US chemical and plastics manufacturers who benefit from structurally cheaper domestic feedstocks while international competitors face supply shocks. The Iran war ends faster than expected (Greer predicts "weeks"), which would normalize global oil prices and erase the relative feedstock cost advantage for US producers.

"We want to make sure that we continue to get the rare earths we need for our manufacturing base..." The USTR explicitly highlights rare earths as a critical vulnerability in the US-China economic relationship. As the US aggressively pursues Section 301 tariffs and broader decoupling (with imports already at 2004 lows), securing domestic rare earth supply chains will become a matter of national security. Domestic producers will likely receive massive government backing, subsidies, or premium pricing to ensure the US manufacturing base survives a total trade war. LONG domestic rare earth miners as strategic, government-backed assets in the ongoing geopolitical decoupling. China floods the global market with artificially cheap rare earths to bankrupt Western producers before protective tariffs can be fully implemented.

"We're seeing things like GE has announced, you know, another $3 billion worth of investment, 1000 jobs across five states... We're seeing it in the data and we're seeing it in the actual, you know, expansion of manufacturing in America." Greer uses General Electric as the poster child for the administration's industrial policy success. When a government official explicitly names a company as the standard-bearer for their economic agenda, it implies continued political support and favorable treatment for that entity's domestic industrial projects. Long US Industrials that are onshoring capacity. Execution risk on large-scale capital projects; potential global economic slowdown reducing demand for industrial equipment.

"We're already seeing Stellantis, GM and others announce new lines and using up excess open capacity in the United States to make more cars here. So we're already seeing a good effect from the president's trade policies." The Trade Representative explicitly validates these specific companies for aligning with the administration's "reshoring" goals. By cracking down on auto imports from Mexico (which he identifies as a "big problem"), the administration is creating a protected regulatory moat for automakers that shift production domestically. Regulatory tailwinds favor legacy US automakers increasing domestic capex over importers. Retaliatory tariffs from trade partners could hurt global sales; higher labor costs in the US could compress margins despite tariff protection.

"We're already seeing Stellantis, GM and others announce new lines and using up excess open capacity in the United States to make more cars here. So we're already seeing a good effect from the president's trade policies." The Trade Representative explicitly validates these specific companies for aligning with the administration's "reshoring" goals. By cracking down on auto imports from Mexico (which he identifies as a "big problem"), the administration is creating a protected regulatory moat for automakers that shift production domestically. Regulatory tailwinds favor legacy US automakers increasing domestic capex over importers. Retaliatory tariffs from trade partners could hurt global sales; higher labor costs in the US could compress margins despite tariff protection.