TOYO follow-up: I went back through the filings after the comments. Here’s what I found.

I did look into that, and I agree financing is probably the biggest execution risk left. One important update is that TOYO is no longer in a working-capital deficit. At June 30 it had $29.8M of positive working capital and $123.4M of cash and restricted cash. H1 generated $61.4M of operating cash flow against $27.8M of capex. That’s encouraging, although the balance-sheet repair wasn’t purely organic. The VSUN loan extension and equity raises mattered too. The $357M cell plant also isn’t $357M due upfront. TOYO describes it as a 20-month project built in structured phases, and management said in May that some spending would happen in 2026 but the majority would fall in 2027. Principal equipment has already been secured, with engineering, permitting and contractor selection underway. They’ve also given a funding framework: internal cash flow, non-dilutive project financing, potential strategic partners and value-accretive equity. More recently they’ve talked about using Section 232 duty offsets and preserved working capital to help fund the U.S. buildout. So yes, dilution is absolutely still a risk. If they tried to fund most of $357M by issuing common stock anywhere near $4, the thesis gets ugly fast. But I also don’t think “$357M plant = $357M of dilution” is a reasonable assumption. The whole point of project financing and strategic capital is to avoid funding a project like this entirely through common equity. They’re not starting from zero either. The existing business is profitable and cash-generative, one Texas module line is already producing revenue, the second is supposed to take the site toward 2 GW, and 45X improves the economics of manufacturing here. I’m also a bit more comfortable with the execution risk because of who they’ve put around it. CFO Yasunari Harada has 30+ years of banking and capital-markets experience, including Morgan Stanley, BNP Paribas and Société Générale. Rhone Resch brings deep U.S. solar-policy experience from running SEIA. That obviously doesn’t guarantee anything, but capital raising and U.S. policy are basically the two biggest problems TOYO needs to solve, and those are very relevant backgrounds. So I agree with your framing. Buying TOYO here is partly a bet that management can turn the current offshore earnings into a vertically integrated U.S. business without destroying the share count along the way. If they execute the financing badly, the thesis gets ugly. If they can combine operating cash flow, project financing, strategic capital, policy support and only modest equity, then a sub-$200M market cap starts looking very different. The Oct. 6 Investor Day in Humble should be one of the better opportunities for management to explain exactly how they plan to do it.