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# KOSPI fell 22.2% from Monday’s high to Wednesday’s low while Korean institutions bought $2.17 billion
**English disclaimer:** I’m Korean and English is not my first language, so I used GPT to help translate and organize this post. Consider it language doping, not data doping. If something is wrong, please challenge the numbers rather than insulting my English.
South Korea’s stock market experienced an extraordinary two-session collapse.
The KOSPI reached **6,768.02 at 3:19 p.m. on July 27**. By **1:14 p.m. on July 29**, it had fallen to 5,435.81, a decline of **19.68% from that high**.
[The KOSPI index fell unilaterally by 19.68% in two days.](https://preview.redd.it/9qzzag1ao5gh1.jpg?width=1320&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=8124e6f98f0003e249355776e6477fdb72964ffe)
The index subsequently reached an intraday low of **5,262.77**, meaning the full peak-to-trough decline from the July 27 high was approximately **22.24%**.
For July 29 alone, the KOSPI fell as much as **12.63% from the previous closing price**. It then rebounded **7.61% from its intraday low** and closed at **5,663.24, down 5.98% for the day**. ([연합뉴스](https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260729006752320?section=economy-finance%2Feconomy&utm_source=chatgpt.com))
# Foreign-investor activity
Using an exchange rate of **US$1 = ₩1,451.70**:
* **KOSPI cash equities:** Foreign investors net sold approximately **₩1.216 trillion**, or about **US$837.4 million**
* **KOSPI 200 futures:** Foreign investors net bought approximately **₩440.2 billion**, or about **US$303.2 million**
* **Total KOSPI short-selling turnover:** Approximately **₩1.844 trillion**, or **US$1.270 billion**
* **Foreign investors’ share of short-selling turnover:** **74.77%**, equivalent to approximately **US$949.9 million**
* **Program trading:** Net bought approximately **₩498.5 billion**, or **US$343.4 million**
These figures cannot simply be added together.
Short-selling turnover is a gross trading figure and is included within cash-market selling activity. It does not mean outstanding short positions increased by that amount.
Program trading is an order classification, not a separate investor group, and may overlap with foreign or institutional transactions.
The futures figure is also only daily net buying. It does not show how much represented:
* Short covering
* Newly opened long positions
* Index hedging against single-stock shorts
* Cash-equity exposure being replaced with futures
* Intraday positions that were closed before the end of the session
One plausible hedge structure was therefore:
**Short or sell semiconductor stocks while buying KOSPI 200 futures to hedge against a broad market rebound.**
That would allow a fund to profit if Samsung Electronics or SK Hynix underperformed the broader index, even if its index-futures long position initially lost money.
# Korean institutions attempted to absorb the selling
Korean institutions net bought approximately **₩3.149 trillion**, equivalent to about **US$2.169 billion**:
* **Financial investment firms:** ₩1.828 trillion / **US$1.259 billion**
* **Private funds:** ₩518.3 billion / **US$357.0 million**
* **Investment trusts:** ₩345.6 billion / **US$238.1 million**
* **Pension funds and related institutions:** ₩338.1 billion / **US$232.9 million**
* **Insurance companies:** ₩126.0 billion / **US$86.8 million**
* **Other financial institutions:** ₩5.5 billion / **US$3.8 million**
* **Banks:** Net sold ₩12.6 billion / **US$8.7 million**
Despite approximately **$2.17 billion of institutional net buying**, the market still suffered a historic intraday collapse. Institutions accounted for roughly ₩3.149 trillion of net buying while foreign investors and retail investors were net sellers. ([머니투데이](https://www.mt.co.kr/en/stock/2026/07/29/2026072916062263660?utm_source=chatgpt.com))
However, more than **58% of institutional net buying came from financial investment firms**. That category can include securities-dealer hedging, ETF flows, liquidity-provision activity and arbitrage. It should not all be interpreted as long-term institutional investors voluntarily buying the dip.
[Goldman Sachs shouted a target price of 480,000 won for Samsung Electronics to the press, dumped all 1.21 million shares, and ran off before the market closed today!](https://preview.redd.it/u4jfl220p5gh1.png?width=1268&format=png&auto=webp&s=3b5f280bc48a61c1deac3df5a6a41af70f208c4e)
# The Goldman Sachs brokerage-channel transaction
A Korean financial article shown in the attached screenshot attributed a **₩480,000 target price for Samsung Electronics** to Goldman Sachs, along with a Buy recommendation. Korean media also reported that target. ([뉴스스페이스](https://www.newsspace.kr/news/article.html?no=14151&utm_source=chatgpt.com))
The attached KRX-based brokerage screen shows the following Samsung Electronics transactions:
* At **3:30:09 p.m.**, approximately **1,219,227 shares were net sold through the Goldman Sachs brokerage channel**
* The Goldman Sachs channel’s cumulative net quantity for the day was approximately **-5,495,823 shares**
* At the same timestamp, the JPMorgan Seoul channel showed a cumulative net purchase of approximately **+6,350,452 shares**
Therefore, the screenshot does **not** merely show that 1.21 million shares were sold during the day.
It shows a large transaction of roughly **1.22 million shares at the closing print**, while the Goldman Sachs channel’s total cumulative net selling for the session was approximately **5.50 million shares**.
But an important distinction must be made:
**Brokerage-channel data does not identify the ultimate owner of the order.**
The sellers could have been Goldman Sachs clients, hedge funds, asset managers, market-making accounts, swap counterparties or Goldman’s own proprietary positions. The screenshot alone cannot prove that Goldman Sachs itself liquidated 5.5 million shares from its own balance sheet.
# Why Korean retail investors call this “seolgeoji”
In Korean stock-market slang, **“seolgeoji” — literally “washing the dishes” — describes a situation in which bullish narratives attract late retail buyers, while earlier or better-informed participants exit and leave retail investors holding the losses.**
To many Korean retail investors, the sequence looked exactly like that:
1. Extremely bullish earnings forecasts and aggressive price targets were circulated
2. Semiconductor shares became heavily concentrated in the index
3. Foreign investors sold large amounts of cash equities and dominated short-selling turnover
4. Korean institutions deployed more than $2.1 billion in net buying
5. A major closing transaction appeared through the Goldman Sachs brokerage channel
6. Retail investors were left facing losses after a historic market collapse
This does **not** prove illegal manipulation or prove that the research analysts and trading accounts acted together.
It does, however, explain why Korean retail investors view the episode as an extraordinary conflict between bullish Wall Street research narratives and the actual order flow visible in the market.
# Verified conclusion
**The KOSPI fell 22.24% from its July 27 high to its July 29 intraday low. Korean institutions net bought approximately $2.17 billion, while foreign investors sold cash equities and accounted for nearly 75% of short-selling turnover.**
**The Goldman Sachs brokerage channel showed approximately 5.50 million Samsung Electronics shares net sold for the day, including approximately 1.22 million shares at the closing print.**