No qualifying author-owned investment thesis was confirmed in this post.
The author explicitly states 'No position' and frames the analysis as a question rather than a directional investment judgment.
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Been digging through TDOC filings. The business is basically two segments:
**Integrated Care (B2B):** \~$1.5B revenue run-rate, **\~17% adjusted segment EBITDA margin (before corporate overhead allocation, per segment reporting)**, \~102M members, sticky PMPM contracts, low-single-digit growth. It’s not exciting, but it’s real infrastructure.
**BetterHelp (DTC therapy):** revenue declining \~8–10% YoY, \~1–2% margins, losing paying users quarter after quarter.
At **\~$7/share** the whole company trades at roughly **\~$1.6B EV**. They generated **\~$170M in reported FCF in 2024 (after SBC, per company definition)** and **retired \~$550M of convertible notes from cash in 2025**, leaving roughly **\~$1.4B of long-term debt/convertibles** on the balance sheet.
If you apply a **conservative 8x EV/EBITDA** to Integrated Care’s segment EBITDA (comparable B2B health platforms often trade in the **10–14x** range, so 8x is intentionally conservative), you already get a value **north of the entire current enterprise value**. That implies the market is assigning little to no value to BetterHelp and any optionality from the insurance pivot.
So where is my math breaking? Is the **corporate overhead allocation + remaining debt structure** enough to close this gap, or is this just a structurally impaired, hated stock trading below the value of its parts?
Earnings Feb 24 after close. No position.